Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly

Title
Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly
Author(s)
이용주
Keywords
RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC NETWORKS; STABLE NETWORKS; COURNOT; DUOPOLY; MODEL; SPILLOVERS; BERTRAND
Issue Date
201406
Publisher
KOREAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
Citation
KOREAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, v.30, no.1, pp.41 - 66
Abstract
We analyze the information sharing incentives of firms in a decentralized environment when firms face a stochastic demand. In order to do that, we develop a two stage model of strategic network formation, which consists of cooperative network formation in the first stage and noncooperative Bayesian Cournot competition in the second stage. Then we derive pure strategy mixed cooperative and noncooperative equilibria that are stable and subgame-perfect, and characterize the equilibrium graph structure. Our main finding is that the incentives of firms for information sharing may vary depending on whether the decision is made in a centralized or a decentralized environment.
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/YU.REPOSITORY/31882
ISSN
0254-3737
Appears in Collections:
상경대학 > 경제금융학부 > Articles
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