On the Prevalence of Online Trade among Strangers: A Game-Theoretic Explanation

Title
On the Prevalence of Online Trade among Strangers: A Game-Theoretic Explanation
Author(s)
이용주
Keywords
PRISONERS-DILEMMA; MAGHRIBI TRADERS; SOCIAL NORMS; COOPERATION; REPUTATION; INFORMATION; TRUST; RECIPROCITY
Issue Date
201106
Publisher
KOREAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
Citation
KOREAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, v.27, no.1, pp.139 - 161
Abstract
Motivated by the prevalence of online trade among strangers through consumer-to-consumer transactions, we examine by random matching the theoretical possibility of a social nom of trust and reciprocity emerging among strangers in the infinitely repeated buyer-sender game. Players are completely anonymous and interact only at randomly determined times. Based on the study by Kandori (1992), we show that the social norm of trust and the reciprocation of trust can be sustained in a population of self-interested, anonymous strangers when trust and reciprocity are attached to the community as a whole. Sufficient conditions that support trust and reciprocity as a sequential equilibrium are provided.
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/YU.REPOSITORY/25053
ISSN
0254-3737
Appears in Collections:
상경대학 > 경제금융학부 > Articles
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